St. Anselm's Ontological Argument

The buzz on the interwebs these days amongst lay people in religion forums where theists and atheists clash is what many people are calling "The Ontological Argument" which is in fact 'The Cosmological Argument.' It states that creation exists and therefore something caused it to exist, that 'cause' would be reasonably defined as God, i.e. an uncreated creator who is not temporally or spatially conditioned, and who is all powerful over creation (omnipotent and omnipresent). They are right to call this an ontological argument because, it deals with the existence of creation and God; and ontology is the study of being.

The great irony here is that the theist is taking up the side of rationalism and the atheist is taking up the side of empiricism. That's ironic, of course, because the claim leveled against theists by atheists is that they are irrational. The atheist is denying the existence of 'The Cause' because there is no empirical evidence of that 'Cause,' whereas the theist approaches the issue rationally like an algebraic equation where P= 1. The atheist's view states that all knowledge must come from experiencing what is, and the theist's view is quite the opposite and states that it isn't necessary to import any information about the universe in order to know something. For instance, if we say that 1=1 we know it to be true, and if we say 1<1 we know it to be false because it must be itself. But if we say 1<?, then we know that the latter two propositions cannot be the case and we know that any number less that 1 cannot be the case, and so by making an assumption, proving a contradiction, and ejecting it we know that there is such a number that is at least greater than one: 1<2. This is how we know that there are an infinite amount of numbers without having counted them all, because we can assume, show a contradiction and eject using the rational approach which doesn't import any premise found in the empirical universe. And further proof of that is, we can conceive of a number that is larger than any amount of anything in the universe, which exceeds tangible proofs.    

However, the ontological argument that stands out in philosophical circles is St. Anselm's Ontological Argument for the existence of God, or 'The Perfect.' Instead of using something which may be reasonably perceived as caused (creation itself) as a proof for God's existence, it offers a rational proof for the existence of God after the same manner of mathematics, and it goes like this (df means same as):

1.) The Perfect = df Something other than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2.) The Perfect = The Perfect = df (X=X)
 /.: 3.) The Perfect cannot be conceived not to be.

Now, the average person will say," That is a load of crap. I could replace God or 'The Perfect' with a Unicorn and prove the existence of unicorns, square circles, a number which is both greater and less than one, and I can prove the existence of men who are women." Not so. This is because 'The Perfect' necessarily exists according to the definition of 'The Perfect' and is therefore a necessary being, whereas unicorns and the other things are contingent. I'll show you what I mean.

The above argument, the three premises, are predicated by the description of 'The Perfect' in St. Anselm's 'Proslogion II." It states that:

1.) 'The Perfect' has all positive properties. (This is because evil is a lack of something and not the presence of anything. Therefore, to have negative qualities would delimit anything perfect, even in a mathematical sense, but to be sure, also in an ethical, moral, and substantial sense. Thus, 'The Perfect' would not be perfect if it had negative qualities. So it's necessary for 'The Perfect' to have all positive qualities.)
2.) Existence is one such property.
/.: 3.) 'The Perfect' exists.

We cannot conceive of a thing such as 'The Perfect' that does not exist, because existence itself is necessary to formulating the concept of 'The Perfect.' Such a necessary being might represent X. Now, if we conceive of the selfsame being that is contingent, and say it is also X, then we have a contradiction, and the conception is necessarily false, because a thing cannot exist as a necessary being and a contingent being at once. This is because a contingent being can fail to exist, but a necessary being cannot fail to exist. It must be one or the other.

So, we can certainly conceive of such a unicorn that exists and we can conceive one that does not exist, because it is not necessary that unicorns exist for us to conceive of them accurately. But in order to accurately conceive of 'The Perfect' it is necessary to conceive of it existing, otherwise it is not itself. This is because 'The Perfect' is something other than which none greater can be conceived, and that being the case if we conceived of something other than which none greater can be conceived that did not exist, it would be less than something other than which none greater can be conceived that does exist. So, it is impossible to conceive of God not existing and have an accurate conception of Him because (X =X). That is not the case with unicorns, men who are women, square circles or the like.

Human beings are rational creatures, and one of the things that predicates reason in a being is its ability to distinguish between true statements and contradictions. Every person knows that (p=/=p) is a contradiction precisely because they have reason. However, the atheist thinks that he can conceive of 'The Perfect' not existing, which is a contradiction and necessarily false; it's unintelligible to even say. It only becomes intelligible if his conception is not identical to 'The Perfect,' in which case he still hasn't dismissed God but a non-God, and therefore the assertion is still nonsense and unintelligible. Again, this is because a being that must exist is greater than a being that can exist and not exist.

The most immediate and common atheistic reply to this argument comes from 'Positivism' which is basically empiricism. The atheist would reply," Very clever, but it's an empty concept. You have no empirical evidence of such a being and even if you could make contact with such a being you would have no way to prove it to be what it is because it is infinite, and likewise we atheists would have no way of disproving it because it is immeasurable."

However, this approach is problematic, because of two little words: good and bad. If you take this approach that states 'only that which is empirical has meaning', it follows necessarily that good and bad are also rejected, or at least diminished to a merely emotional value.

At that point the whole subject of ethics disappears. Saying that rape, murder, or genocide are bad, or that philanthropy, volunteering, and nurture are good becomes a mere expression of emotions, with absolutely no substance. Subjects aren't good or bad, they don't have positive or negative properties, you are merely projecting your emotions (which mean nothing) onto things which themselves have no intrinsic value (everything is worthless). So, ethics and morals become meaningless subjective nonsense under the lens of 'Positivism,' because 'Positivism' is empirical and excludes reason; and a 'do what thou whilt' attitude sets in. Rationalism is diametrically opposed to 'Positivism' because, rationalism states that sentient beings do have intrinsic value, and that because of this there are concrete morals and ethics, and an attitude of 'lawfulness' takes root.   

So, the atheist empiricist comes off rather badly from this argument, because he is a fool for thinking he can conceive of what cannot be conceived and insists on a contradiction that is necessarily false, while admitting that he does not believe in morals or ethics, and that he believes nothing has any meaning and everything is worthless. On the other hand, the theist rationalist comes off rather well. He asserts what is necessarily so, gives assent to ethics and morals, and states that sentient beings do have intrinsic value.

This argument really pulls the atheist's pants down, and shows him to be in fact the opposite of what he wants to seem. He desires to seem a courageous, hyper-rational stoic who is brave enough to face the nothing that the theist is so afraid of he goes and makes 'an imaginary friend in the sky'. Because of this he would have people think that he is the moral and intellectual superior of the theist, because he makes himself seem braver and more rational. When in fact the atheist doesn't believe in any kind of real courage, because he doesn't believe in virtues, ethics or morals; and beyond this, he isn't the intellectual superior in any case because he gives assent to that which cannot be logically admitted... which of course makes him seem rather stupid.

Anyway, that's St. Anselm's Ontological Argument.              

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Aristotle's Ontology

Question: How does Aristotle answer the fundamental ontological question,” What are the basic realities (ousia/ substance)? How does his answer differ from Plato’s?

            Aristotle’s explanation was that there are two basic kinds of ousia: primary substance and secondary substance. Then, there are other kinds of things that pertain to these. Primary substances, according to Aristotle, are those things which are neither said of (asserted of), nor present in, a subject. That is, individual things, e.g. this man, this ox, this snake, this tree… etc. These ‘individual’ things require sentience; they need both a nutritive and a reproductive soul. Due to the presence of a reproductive soul, they must also be able to reproduce their own kind. Further, they must be of natural kinds, id est things given by nature. They must be identifiable (separate) and re-identifiable (capable of taking on contraries). Here, Aristotle is stating, contrary to Plato, that these primary substances ARE the things themselves, whereas Plato asserted that these things were composites of forms beyond themselves. So, according to Aristotle, the form ‘ox’ isn’t present in ‘this ox,’ neither is the ox participating in the form ‘ox,’ but the ox is an ox, and therefore the universal ‘ox’ exists. ‘This ox’ isn’t said of the universal ‘ox,’ however, because it isn’t all ‘ox.’ 

            Primary substances are those things of which everything is predicated, but which are not predicated of anything. In other words, the 'universal' [man] is predicated by the existence of things like Socrates, but the universal [man] does not necessitate the existence of the man Socrates. This brings us to the secondary substances. 

            The secondary substances, according to Aristotle, are ‘said of’ a subject, but not ‘present in’ a subject. For example, take the sentence,” Socrates is a [man].” Socrates is obviously the primary substance (this man) and so [man] is the secondary substance. Socrates is a man; [man] is said of Socrates. But, ‘Socrates’ isn’t said of [man]… otherwise, we would all be Socrates! So, Socrates is being (ontologically) a man. He is a man, but [man] is not Socrates. 

            I had said that there were other kinds of things which pertain to primary and secondary substances. Aristotle said that one of these other kinds of things, were 'in' individuals in categories other than substance. Of these he said that they are ‘in a subject,’ but not said of any subject. The example Aristotle gives is ‘knowledge of grammar’ and it is easy to see what he means here. The knowledge of grammar is ‘in’ Socrates, but no one would say that Socrates ‘is’ the knowledge of grammar. So, these things are an entirely different substance than ‘ox’ or ‘this ox.’ 

            The other kind of things that pertain to primary and secondary substances are those things which are both ‘in’ and ‘said of’ subjects. This idea has recourse to Aristotle’s belief that things are the primary basis. What I mean is, or rather what Aristotle means, is that the primary things are necessary to these things. An easy example is that I am blond. ‘I’ predicate ‘blondness,’ but blondness does not predicate me. [Blond] exists because individual things that are blond exist. Blond is both said of me and in me. 

            All of these ousia above listed form categories of themselves and develop a taxonomy of quantities, qualities, relations, and places. So, for example, if you have the primary substance (individual) of Socrates, the next thing is up the teleology is the species [man]. Then, above that is the genus [animal]. And above that would probably be [being] and it wouldn't go any higher, because being is being; it's not a composite of universals like Socrates, man, and animal are.

            Aristotle also classifies these substances according to their causes, of which there are four. These causes are teleological explanations and therefore pertain to teleology and the nature of the substances. The first cause is ‘that out of which a thing is made and which remains after the change;’ this is the 'material cause,' e.g. the metal out of which a hammer is made. The second cause is ‘that into which a thing is made;’ this is the 'formal cause,' e.g. the hammer itself. The third cause is ‘that by which a thing is made;’ this is the 'efficient cause,' e.g. the blacksmith who made the hammer. The fourth cause is ‘that for the sake of which a thing is made;’ this is the 'final cause,' e.g. the hammer was made for pulling nails and pounding them in. So, according to Aristotle, there is a teleological explanation for everything. 

            Now, Plato’s ideas differ from Aristotle’s. Aristotle does a good job of explaining the difference in the sixth chapter of the Metaphysics. He points out that Socrates was in pursuit of what Aristotle termed ‘universals of ethics’ instead of the things themselves, i.e. ethical things. Socrates was looking for [virtue] and not virtuous things. Plato took this pattern of pursuit and applied it to all the things themselves. For Aristotle, universals were bi-products of individual things. For Plato, individual things were the bi-products of universals, and the individual things weren’t really individuals, rather, they were composites of what Plato called 'forms.'

            So, for a working example: Aristotle would say that heroism exists because individual things are heroic, and white exists because there are white things, and that the individual man is the predication of these things. Plato, however, would say that the body is merely organon (a tool or a vessel) which participates in the ‘form’ of heroism, and the ‘form’ of whiteness ‘itself.’ Further, because of this difference, they disagreed on the concept of 'flux' which originated with the Heracleiteans. For Aristotle, primary and secondary substances were always in a state of flux because they were taking on contraries at varying rates. For Plato, the organon of matter was simply participating in forms one instant and other forms the next. 

            So, very basically, Aristotle was a materialist; things were and are, in and of themselves, their own explanation. Plato, on the other hand said that a whole host of other things in and from the 'intelligible realm' were necessary to the existence of sensible things. For Aristotle, the rock is a rock, because it is a rock, and from the individual 'rock' comes the universal [rock] and [gray] and so forth. For Plato, the matter of the rock was participating in the form ‘rock,’ and the form ‘one,’ and the form ‘gray,’ and the form ‘hard.’ Plato’s philosophy multiplied problems by saying that the answers were elsewhere in the intelligible realm, doubling the subjects. Aristotle’s philosophy took the answers out of the intelligible realm and put them back into the sensible and said,” The answer is right here, and there’s no need to multiply the problem.”

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~