St. Thomas' Five Ways To Prove The Existence of God

The nice thing about organized religion as opposed to disorganized religion is that the former at least tries to be objective and rational, whereas the latter is unashamedly biased and uninterested in rational and empirical proofs. Indeed, they prefer emotional proofs; a crude mysticism appeals to what we might call the ‘disordered religious mind.’ 

            St. Thomas comes to the front during the High Middle Ages, doing much to eradicate excessive forms of mysticism and rationalism, via Aristotle’s logic, but also his empiricism. It was a huge task; it was upon him to synthesize the entire Christian religion through the Aristotelian philosophy. Prior to St. Thomas of Aquino, no one had really fielded a sound theological theory based on Aristotle. The Church was still meddling with various forms of Platonism and Augustinian philosophy.

            St. Thomas, wasn’t so much innovating anything new, rather he was taking very old concepts from the Greeks and hackneying them out for Parisian scholasticists, on the field of Catholic theology. The concept of a necessary being goes back to the pre- Socratics. However, this old game gets a second wind with St. Thomas.

            Using the Aristotle’s organon and his philosophy of causes, St. Thomas crafts an argument which is popularly called ‘The Five Ways.’ It seems to be a single argument, one of causation; however, it’s five ways to prove that God exists, i.e. that God is a necessary being. Again, it proves ‘that God is’ not ‘what God is;’ these arguments do nothing to prove the existence of the Christian God, beyond that God is a single being as opposed to multiple gods, which Christianity professes to be the case. 

            The ‘first way’ to prove the necessary existence of God is the argument from motion. We know empirically that some things are in motion, and according to Aristotle things move when ‘potentiality’ of movement becomes ‘actuality.’ That is to say, wherever [X] causes [Y] to be f, it is because [X] is actually f and [Y] has the potentiality to be f. So, as the scholasticists would say, only something which is motion in the ‘act’ can cause something potentially in motion to be actually in motion. Further, nothing can be both in potentiality and actuality in the same instant, in the same way, and because of this nothing can move itself. Therefore, anything that is in motion was put into motion, or moved, by something else. That pattern of moving, or more specifically the pattern of ‘being caused to move’ can’t go on infinitely; that is an impossibility for obvious reasons. These premises, if true, necessitate an ‘unmoved mover,’ as I believe Aristotle termed it, a being that was not put into motion by anything and yet causes all things to be in motion. This necessary being St. Thomas asserts is understood by everyone to be God. 

            The ‘second way’ is constructed in a nearly identical fashion to that of the ‘first way’ and deals with efficient causes. However, because of the similitude of the arguments it is superfluous to demonstrate the argument. So, I will simply proceed to the Dumb Ox’s (St. Thomas) ‘third way.’

            The ‘third way’ to prove that God is a ‘necessary being’ is said to be a reductio argument. The argument begins by pointing out that ‘contingent beings’ are evident in nature, i.e. such beings as do not necessarily exist. In point of fact, this would include all beings that we are empirically aware of, and St. Thomas asserts this fact. Now, for each contingent being that exists, there is a time in which it does not exist (which is better to say than a time in which it did not exist). So, it is impossible for these contingent beings to always exist. For instance, we can look at the extinction and destruction of individual and particular contingent things, and discern the possibility of the same for all contingent things. Therefore, it is plausible that there was a time when no contingent things existed. Hence, there would have been nothing to bring contingent things into existence and if that were the case, then nothing would exist. However, this is absurd and a contradiction, the argument has been reduced to its most absurd point. So, it cannot be that every being is a contingent being, because it leads to a contradiction. In this we see, and St. Thomas would say that we know, that there is such a being that exists which is necessary, that is not caused to be by anything, but causes all things to be. This necessary being, St. Thomas asserts is God. 

            The ‘fourth way’ to prove the necessary existence of God is an argument of gradation. It is perhaps the simplest of the arguments which might be called ‘convincing,’ and it starts off by simply pointing out that some things are better and worse than others. In order to denote degrees of ‘better’ and ‘worse’ when talking about beings, with any validity, it is necessary to have a concept of the most extreme example. The most extreme case is the teleological cause of things which are the same. Apply this principle to ‘perfection’ and ‘being,’ and it follows necessarily that there is a primary cause of all things perfect, and all things that have being. This necessary being, St. Thomas’ asserts, is called God.

            The ‘fifth’ way is the least convincing argument and most subjective, or at least I find it to be so, and it does not interest me in the slightest. So, I will not hazard an explanation of the fifth argument, other than that it is an argument from design.      

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

St. Anselm's Ontological Argument

The buzz on the interwebs these days amongst lay people in religion forums where theists and atheists clash is what many people are calling "The Ontological Argument" which is in fact 'The Cosmological Argument.' It states that creation exists and therefore something caused it to exist, that 'cause' would be reasonably defined as God, i.e. an uncreated creator who is not temporally or spatially conditioned, and who is all powerful over creation (omnipotent and omnipresent). They are right to call this an ontological argument because, it deals with the existence of creation and God; and ontology is the study of being.

The great irony here is that the theist is taking up the side of rationalism and the atheist is taking up the side of empiricism. That's ironic, of course, because the claim leveled against theists by atheists is that they are irrational. The atheist is denying the existence of 'The Cause' because there is no empirical evidence of that 'Cause,' whereas the theist approaches the issue rationally like an algebraic equation where P= 1. The atheist's view states that all knowledge must come from experiencing what is, and the theist's view is quite the opposite and states that it isn't necessary to import any information about the universe in order to know something. For instance, if we say that 1=1 we know it to be true, and if we say 1<1 we know it to be false because it must be itself. But if we say 1<?, then we know that the latter two propositions cannot be the case and we know that any number less that 1 cannot be the case, and so by making an assumption, proving a contradiction, and ejecting it we know that there is such a number that is at least greater than one: 1<2. This is how we know that there are an infinite amount of numbers without having counted them all, because we can assume, show a contradiction and eject using the rational approach which doesn't import any premise found in the empirical universe. And further proof of that is, we can conceive of a number that is larger than any amount of anything in the universe, which exceeds tangible proofs.    

However, the ontological argument that stands out in philosophical circles is St. Anselm's Ontological Argument for the existence of God, or 'The Perfect.' Instead of using something which may be reasonably perceived as caused (creation itself) as a proof for God's existence, it offers a rational proof for the existence of God after the same manner of mathematics, and it goes like this (df means same as):

1.) The Perfect = df Something other than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2.) The Perfect = The Perfect = df (X=X)
 /.: 3.) The Perfect cannot be conceived not to be.

Now, the average person will say," That is a load of crap. I could replace God or 'The Perfect' with a Unicorn and prove the existence of unicorns, square circles, a number which is both greater and less than one, and I can prove the existence of men who are women." Not so. This is because 'The Perfect' necessarily exists according to the definition of 'The Perfect' and is therefore a necessary being, whereas unicorns and the other things are contingent. I'll show you what I mean.

The above argument, the three premises, are predicated by the description of 'The Perfect' in St. Anselm's 'Proslogion II." It states that:

1.) 'The Perfect' has all positive properties. (This is because evil is a lack of something and not the presence of anything. Therefore, to have negative qualities would delimit anything perfect, even in a mathematical sense, but to be sure, also in an ethical, moral, and substantial sense. Thus, 'The Perfect' would not be perfect if it had negative qualities. So it's necessary for 'The Perfect' to have all positive qualities.)
2.) Existence is one such property.
/.: 3.) 'The Perfect' exists.

We cannot conceive of a thing such as 'The Perfect' that does not exist, because existence itself is necessary to formulating the concept of 'The Perfect.' Such a necessary being might represent X. Now, if we conceive of the selfsame being that is contingent, and say it is also X, then we have a contradiction, and the conception is necessarily false, because a thing cannot exist as a necessary being and a contingent being at once. This is because a contingent being can fail to exist, but a necessary being cannot fail to exist. It must be one or the other.

So, we can certainly conceive of such a unicorn that exists and we can conceive one that does not exist, because it is not necessary that unicorns exist for us to conceive of them accurately. But in order to accurately conceive of 'The Perfect' it is necessary to conceive of it existing, otherwise it is not itself. This is because 'The Perfect' is something other than which none greater can be conceived, and that being the case if we conceived of something other than which none greater can be conceived that did not exist, it would be less than something other than which none greater can be conceived that does exist. So, it is impossible to conceive of God not existing and have an accurate conception of Him because (X =X). That is not the case with unicorns, men who are women, square circles or the like.

Human beings are rational creatures, and one of the things that predicates reason in a being is its ability to distinguish between true statements and contradictions. Every person knows that (p=/=p) is a contradiction precisely because they have reason. However, the atheist thinks that he can conceive of 'The Perfect' not existing, which is a contradiction and necessarily false; it's unintelligible to even say. It only becomes intelligible if his conception is not identical to 'The Perfect,' in which case he still hasn't dismissed God but a non-God, and therefore the assertion is still nonsense and unintelligible. Again, this is because a being that must exist is greater than a being that can exist and not exist.

The most immediate and common atheistic reply to this argument comes from 'Positivism' which is basically empiricism. The atheist would reply," Very clever, but it's an empty concept. You have no empirical evidence of such a being and even if you could make contact with such a being you would have no way to prove it to be what it is because it is infinite, and likewise we atheists would have no way of disproving it because it is immeasurable."

However, this approach is problematic, because of two little words: good and bad. If you take this approach that states 'only that which is empirical has meaning', it follows necessarily that good and bad are also rejected, or at least diminished to a merely emotional value.

At that point the whole subject of ethics disappears. Saying that rape, murder, or genocide are bad, or that philanthropy, volunteering, and nurture are good becomes a mere expression of emotions, with absolutely no substance. Subjects aren't good or bad, they don't have positive or negative properties, you are merely projecting your emotions (which mean nothing) onto things which themselves have no intrinsic value (everything is worthless). So, ethics and morals become meaningless subjective nonsense under the lens of 'Positivism,' because 'Positivism' is empirical and excludes reason; and a 'do what thou whilt' attitude sets in. Rationalism is diametrically opposed to 'Positivism' because, rationalism states that sentient beings do have intrinsic value, and that because of this there are concrete morals and ethics, and an attitude of 'lawfulness' takes root.   

So, the atheist empiricist comes off rather badly from this argument, because he is a fool for thinking he can conceive of what cannot be conceived and insists on a contradiction that is necessarily false, while admitting that he does not believe in morals or ethics, and that he believes nothing has any meaning and everything is worthless. On the other hand, the theist rationalist comes off rather well. He asserts what is necessarily so, gives assent to ethics and morals, and states that sentient beings do have intrinsic value.

This argument really pulls the atheist's pants down, and shows him to be in fact the opposite of what he wants to seem. He desires to seem a courageous, hyper-rational stoic who is brave enough to face the nothing that the theist is so afraid of he goes and makes 'an imaginary friend in the sky'. Because of this he would have people think that he is the moral and intellectual superior of the theist, because he makes himself seem braver and more rational. When in fact the atheist doesn't believe in any kind of real courage, because he doesn't believe in virtues, ethics or morals; and beyond this, he isn't the intellectual superior in any case because he gives assent to that which cannot be logically admitted... which of course makes him seem rather stupid.

Anyway, that's St. Anselm's Ontological Argument.              

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Augustine vs. Messianics

"The trouble was that I knew nothing else; I did not recognize the other, true reality. I was being subtly maneuvered into accepting the views of those stupid deceivers by the questions they constantly asked me about the origins of evil, and whether God was confined to material form with hair and nails, and whether people who practiced polygamy. killed human beings, and offered animal sacrifices could be counted as righteous. Being ignorant of these matters I was very disturbed by the questions, and supposed that I was approaching the truth when in fact I was moving away from it. I did not know that evil is the diminishment of good to the point where nothing at all is left. How could I see that, I whose power of sight was restricted to seeing material shapes with my eyes and imaginary forms with my mind?...." (This is exactly what Messianic are do through their proselytization, except in reverse, because they call into question Christian liberty through the application of the Law of Moses.)

"... I did not know either that true inward righteousness takes as its criterion not customs but the most righteous law of God, by which the morality of countries and times was formed as appropriate to those countries and times, while God's law itself has remained unchanged everywhere and always, not one thing in one place and something different elsewhere. By this norm Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David and all those of whom God spoke approvingly were indeed righteous; they are accounted guilt only by persons of limited experience who judge by some day of human reckoning and measure the conduct of the human race at large by the standard that befits their own. They are like someone who knows nothing about armor, or which piece belongs where, and tries to cover his head with the greaves and his feet with the helmet, and then grumbles because they do not fit properly. Or again, they are like a man who on a certain day which is appointed a public holiday from noon onward is indignant because he is not allowed to set out his goods for sale in the afternoon, although this was allowed in the morning; or like a person who in one and the same house sees something being handled by one servant which another one, who serves drinks, is not allowed to touch, or something being done behind the stables which is not properly done at table, and gets angry about this, complaining because, while there is one house and one staff of servants, the same actions are not permitted to everybody in all places." (This is the great disconnect between Messianics and the rest of Christendom. They struggle with reconciling the vicissitude (changing) of laws, rules, and statutes throughout the ages with the constancy of God's nature. They are missing the philosophical and theological links)

"Equally foolish are people who grow indignant on hearing that some practice was allowed to righteous people in earlier ages which is forbidden to the righteous of our own day, and that God laid down one rule for the former and a different one for the latter, as the difference between the two periods of time demands; whereas in fact both sets of people have been subject to the same norm of righteousness. This attitude is just as stupid as being upset because, with regard to a single man or a single day or a single house, one perceives different pieces of armour to be designed for different limbs, and an activity to be lawful to a certain hour but not afterward, and something to be permitted or even ordered in a corner but forbidden and punished elsewhere. Does this mean that justice is fickle and changeable? No, but the epochs over which she rules do not all unfold in the same way, precisely because times change. Human beings live on earth for a brief span only, and they lack the discernment to bring the conditions of earlier ages, of which they have no experience, into the same frame of reference with those they know well; but they can easily perceive in one body or one day or one house what is appropriate for each limb, each time, and all persons and places. Thus while they may be scandalized by the one, they readily submit to the other." (This is exactly what the Messianics are doing, only in reverse, because they are trying to live in the past.)   





"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Aristotle's Ontology

Question: How does Aristotle answer the fundamental ontological question,” What are the basic realities (ousia/ substance)? How does his answer differ from Plato’s?

            Aristotle’s explanation was that there are two basic kinds of ousia: primary substance and secondary substance. Then, there are other kinds of things that pertain to these. Primary substances, according to Aristotle, are those things which are neither said of (asserted of), nor present in, a subject. That is, individual things, e.g. this man, this ox, this snake, this tree… etc. These ‘individual’ things require sentience; they need both a nutritive and a reproductive soul. Due to the presence of a reproductive soul, they must also be able to reproduce their own kind. Further, they must be of natural kinds, id est things given by nature. They must be identifiable (separate) and re-identifiable (capable of taking on contraries). Here, Aristotle is stating, contrary to Plato, that these primary substances ARE the things themselves, whereas Plato asserted that these things were composites of forms beyond themselves. So, according to Aristotle, the form ‘ox’ isn’t present in ‘this ox,’ neither is the ox participating in the form ‘ox,’ but the ox is an ox, and therefore the universal ‘ox’ exists. ‘This ox’ isn’t said of the universal ‘ox,’ however, because it isn’t all ‘ox.’ 

            Primary substances are those things of which everything is predicated, but which are not predicated of anything. In other words, the 'universal' [man] is predicated by the existence of things like Socrates, but the universal [man] does not necessitate the existence of the man Socrates. This brings us to the secondary substances. 

            The secondary substances, according to Aristotle, are ‘said of’ a subject, but not ‘present in’ a subject. For example, take the sentence,” Socrates is a [man].” Socrates is obviously the primary substance (this man) and so [man] is the secondary substance. Socrates is a man; [man] is said of Socrates. But, ‘Socrates’ isn’t said of [man]… otherwise, we would all be Socrates! So, Socrates is being (ontologically) a man. He is a man, but [man] is not Socrates. 

            I had said that there were other kinds of things which pertain to primary and secondary substances. Aristotle said that one of these other kinds of things, were 'in' individuals in categories other than substance. Of these he said that they are ‘in a subject,’ but not said of any subject. The example Aristotle gives is ‘knowledge of grammar’ and it is easy to see what he means here. The knowledge of grammar is ‘in’ Socrates, but no one would say that Socrates ‘is’ the knowledge of grammar. So, these things are an entirely different substance than ‘ox’ or ‘this ox.’ 

            The other kind of things that pertain to primary and secondary substances are those things which are both ‘in’ and ‘said of’ subjects. This idea has recourse to Aristotle’s belief that things are the primary basis. What I mean is, or rather what Aristotle means, is that the primary things are necessary to these things. An easy example is that I am blond. ‘I’ predicate ‘blondness,’ but blondness does not predicate me. [Blond] exists because individual things that are blond exist. Blond is both said of me and in me. 

            All of these ousia above listed form categories of themselves and develop a taxonomy of quantities, qualities, relations, and places. So, for example, if you have the primary substance (individual) of Socrates, the next thing is up the teleology is the species [man]. Then, above that is the genus [animal]. And above that would probably be [being] and it wouldn't go any higher, because being is being; it's not a composite of universals like Socrates, man, and animal are.

            Aristotle also classifies these substances according to their causes, of which there are four. These causes are teleological explanations and therefore pertain to teleology and the nature of the substances. The first cause is ‘that out of which a thing is made and which remains after the change;’ this is the 'material cause,' e.g. the metal out of which a hammer is made. The second cause is ‘that into which a thing is made;’ this is the 'formal cause,' e.g. the hammer itself. The third cause is ‘that by which a thing is made;’ this is the 'efficient cause,' e.g. the blacksmith who made the hammer. The fourth cause is ‘that for the sake of which a thing is made;’ this is the 'final cause,' e.g. the hammer was made for pulling nails and pounding them in. So, according to Aristotle, there is a teleological explanation for everything. 

            Now, Plato’s ideas differ from Aristotle’s. Aristotle does a good job of explaining the difference in the sixth chapter of the Metaphysics. He points out that Socrates was in pursuit of what Aristotle termed ‘universals of ethics’ instead of the things themselves, i.e. ethical things. Socrates was looking for [virtue] and not virtuous things. Plato took this pattern of pursuit and applied it to all the things themselves. For Aristotle, universals were bi-products of individual things. For Plato, individual things were the bi-products of universals, and the individual things weren’t really individuals, rather, they were composites of what Plato called 'forms.'

            So, for a working example: Aristotle would say that heroism exists because individual things are heroic, and white exists because there are white things, and that the individual man is the predication of these things. Plato, however, would say that the body is merely organon (a tool or a vessel) which participates in the ‘form’ of heroism, and the ‘form’ of whiteness ‘itself.’ Further, because of this difference, they disagreed on the concept of 'flux' which originated with the Heracleiteans. For Aristotle, primary and secondary substances were always in a state of flux because they were taking on contraries at varying rates. For Plato, the organon of matter was simply participating in forms one instant and other forms the next. 

            So, very basically, Aristotle was a materialist; things were and are, in and of themselves, their own explanation. Plato, on the other hand said that a whole host of other things in and from the 'intelligible realm' were necessary to the existence of sensible things. For Aristotle, the rock is a rock, because it is a rock, and from the individual 'rock' comes the universal [rock] and [gray] and so forth. For Plato, the matter of the rock was participating in the form ‘rock,’ and the form ‘one,’ and the form ‘gray,’ and the form ‘hard.’ Plato’s philosophy multiplied problems by saying that the answers were elsewhere in the intelligible realm, doubling the subjects. Aristotle’s philosophy took the answers out of the intelligible realm and put them back into the sensible and said,” The answer is right here, and there’s no need to multiply the problem.”

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Calvinism

The proposition of Calvinism states that God predestines all things. It also has some other propositions and they are as follows:

1.) Damnation is justified (right)= Damnation is willed by God.
2.) What God wills is right. (substantive & synthetic)
3.) What God wills is willed by God. (trivial & analytic)
4.) Proposition 3 is identical to proposition 2.
5.) Proposition 2 is both analytic & not analytic (i.e. synthetic). *contradiction, i.e. an untrue statement..) 
6.) Damnation is right =/= Damnation is willed by God.

Something which is analytic cannot be synthetic, because an analytic statement is necessarily true all the time and in all possible "worlds," whereas a synthetic statement merely tells us about something that is dependent. So for instance: All bachelors are unmarried males, is an analytical statement. Whereas, to say Scott is a bachelor, is synthetic, because bachelorhood isn't necessary to Scott's existence; it isn't necessarily true. Otherwise, if Scott got married, he would die! He would cease to exist and become a non-person, yeah? So, the Calvinist proposition cannot be true, because it says that," What God wills is right." is both analytic and synthetic, which is contradictory and therefore the conclusion of the premises is false. It can be analytic or it can be synthetic, but it cannot be both.


The Calvinist heresy states that some people are predestined to salvation and others are predestined to damnation. In fact, it is popular for them to compare the people who are "damned," which basically means the people they have written off, as pots made to be shattered. They basically compare them to clay pigeons. And they try to justify it by twisting a few Pauline quotes. There's no point in a scripture battle over the matter where Calvinists will take everything out of context and accuse their opponents of the same. So, quite simply, here we have the proof that their proposition is necessarily false. 

The logical proposition which one would get from the Catholic Church is as follows:

A.) Whoever becomes saved must have been damned (not saved).


And of course this follows necessarily from natural theology:


A.) Whatever becomes hot was cold (or not hot).
B.) Whatever becomes dry was wet (or not dry).
C.) Whatever is in motion was in a state of rest. 


Etcetera...


But some of you might be wondering how the first argument might work for anything else, for instance with a Catholic teaching. First, let's outline the form of the argument more clearly:


1.) 'x' is right= df (identical to) 'x' is willed by God.
2.) What God wills is right. (substantive & synthetic)
3.) What God wills is willed by God. (trivial & analytic)
4.) Proposition 3= df Proposition 2.
5.) Proposition 2 is both analytic & not analytic (i.e. synthetic)  * contradiction

    (Because 'x' cannot be both 'f' and not 'f.') 
6.) 'x' is right =/= df 'x is willed by God.'


Having said that much. Here is how it would work for a Catholic teaching: 


1.) Trent is right = Trent is willed by God.
2.) What God wills is right. (substantive & synthetic)
3.) What God wills is willed by God. (trivial & analytic)
4.) Proposition 3 is identical to proposition 2.
5.) Proposition 2 is both analytic & not analytic (i.e. synthetic). *contradiction, i.e. an untrue statement.
6.) Trent is right =/= Trent is willed by God. 

Even though the Holy Spirit was what made Trent valid and true, God does not will imperfection. Trent in all its parts is perfect, but is incomplete in relation to human existence. Incompleteness is imperfection. You must remember that all councils are for the religious government of the faithful who are under original and particular sin. We are working out our salvation. Nothing pertaining to us is perfect and God only wills that which is perfect. Therefore, Trent is not perfect form, only in substance. So, more councils after it are naturally needed.



"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Humanity

Humanity is something that we all have; human is what we are. Our humanity is the "image" of God spoken of in Genesis. If we are totally depraved as the Calvinists say, then it follows necessarily that we are not human. If the image we were created in is totally depraved, there remains nothing left to call human. Christ is called the "kinsman redeemer." It was St. Gregory of Nazianzus who said that, that which is not assumed is not redeemed. Christ redeems humanity and if there is no humanity to redeem, then there is no redemption. The heretical doctrine of Total Depravity seeks to nullify the Incarnation.

Man is certainly depraved by concupiscence; that is not doubted or disputed. However, can one human be more human than another? By all means and this is the work of Christ. Let us begin a discussion of forms. Imagine before you there are two knives. One is dull on the point and on its edge, also corroded and dirty; the other knife is sharp on the point and on it's edge, clean and shinning. Further, imagine that the dull knife has a worn handle that is falling apart and dry rotted. And suppose that the sharp knife's handle is sturdy and sound. If necessity was upon you, which knife would you choose? Certainly, you would choose the sharper, cleaner, and sturdier knife over the dull, decaying knife.

Each of them are knives, no doubt. Yet, you would choose the good knife to the one in disrepair, because the good knife is more like a knife. That is to say, if we define as knife a tool of utility meant for the cutting of food and cloth and other things of a similar sort, then, it is evident to us that the good knife is truer in form to what a knife is than the shoddy knife. The good knife has more knifeness than the bad knife. So, it follows that while they are both knives, the good knife is more of a knife than the bad knife.

Again, let us examine a fruit, a plant. Imagine, that before you are two apple trees; one of them is blotched and cancerous, while the other is healthy and sound. Suppose that the desire to eat an apple came upon you, which tree would you extend your hand to? Would you choose the malformed and blotched, hard fruit of the cancerous apple tree? Or would you not be more likely to reach out and take an apple from the healthful tree, which is succulent, ripe, and shinning? To be sure, you would prefer the wholesome apple to the depraved apple for the very reason that it is more like an apple. It is better for eating and is without blemish or malformation, and is more like an apple than the diseased permutation. Therefore, the good apple and the bad are both apples, yet the good apple has more appleness than the bad apple.

Once more, let us examine animals. Imagine a bitch gave birth to a litter of pups and one of them was mutated, with a malformed jaw and sealed eyes, while it's siblings were sound in form. Suppose further that you were interested in obtaining a pup for breeding other dogs, so as to carry on a pure breed. Which would you choose for this venue? A sound animal or the mutant? Certainly, you would choose one of the sound offspring over the mutant, because it is more like it's own species and breed. Therefore, while all are certainly being dogs, the mutant is less of a dog than its siblings who are sound in form.

We could go on this way with angels as well, and any other species of plant, animal, or object ad infinitum, but there is no need. Therefore, it is rightly said that whatever is more like unto itself is truer. Here we digress to the issue of humanity.

Original Sin deformed mankind so that humanity became less like itself. As a means of remedy, Christ came as a man. In fact, as we can readily discern from our experiment, Christ was more human than the humans he lived amongst and came to die for. Thus, St. Paul was right in calling Him the Second Adam in that He had in His person undelimited humanity. Comparatively, if we use ourselves as the definition of what human means, Christ was superhuman. Yet, in point of fact, Christ alone is the definition of what a human is; He is completely human and it is we who are deficient in humanity.

The Eucharist, which may only be found in the Churches of the Apostles, is given unto us to strengthen us. By receiving the Eucharist, we not only obtain divine graces and mercy, but also become more human by virtue of Christ's humanity which we receive into ourselves. When we look at what God said to Adam in the Garden, we know that Adam was without death. Then, we look at what Christ, Who is God, says to us in the Gospel," Whoever does not eat of My Flesh and drink of My Blood has no life in Him." 

This is the truth and we can go to no one else, for as the apostles said, who else has the words of Life? The more human we become, the more like God we become, because our humanity is being restored to its full glory, the true image of God. But this is not the end of Christ's work, for we are brought into God by receiving the Holy Spirit into us. But here, I've committed to only speaking to you about humanity and must digress from theosis and divinity, though admittedly they are intertwined.

Hitherto, those who faithfully receive the Eucharist and continue in it are becoming more human; they are attaining to Christ's humanity. This is why it is so important to be in a Church with VALID sacraments. This is the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. This is why one should be a Catholic, and why being a "Bible Christian" is not enough. This is only part of what the Most Blessed Sacrament does for us. It is the power of God to put our souls into order. It is the power of God to place our bodies in subjection to the soul. It is the power of God, to literally undo the Gordian Knot of sin and restore our nature. This is how God returns us to being a true microcosm of the Macrocosm, as discussed in my previous note Ecclesiasticus. 

And everything on top of this is working out our salvation, attaining to and obtaining the promises of Christ, becoming joint heirs with Christ. How wonderful that we are not only set in order, having our humanity restored to us, but that we have separate graces so as to participate in the righteousness of God. This is eternal life, the Eucharist, the source and summit of our faith.
 
"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Theodicy - The Problem of Evil

I was commenting recently to an Atheist friend; the eminent Richard Dawkins had come up on her page. I was wondering what Richard Dawkins would do with a guy like Ken Miller, a well published molecular and cell biologist who gives assent to evolution and does his own debates against American Evangelical Creationism. Ken Miller is Roman Catholic and says that he is a theist in the broadest sense. Admittedly, that can only mean one thing... he doesn't give much attention to his faith.

A little while later it dawned on me," You know... that probably wouldn't be that great of a debate." The reason being is that the only thing they would have to argue about is the cosmological argument, which is the issue of whether or not the universe has a cause and what that might be. The other thing they might argue about is theodicy, which addresses the problem of evil.

These are the two pitfalls of such debates. It's one thing to watch an atheist scientist beat up on a theist rhetorician who parrots second hand Creationist arguments, to watch an atheist scientist and a theist scientist shrug in agreement, but quite another to watch them wade into a mire of philosophical issues they don't have the credentials to discuss.

So often people watch these epic clashes, bedazzled by the scientific jargon, sitting on the edge of their seats, mesmerized by the simultaneous embarrassment and verbal glory of the debaters. We forget that these men are usually specialists, or at least pretend to be. They are either theologians, scientists, philosophers, or mere rhetoricians. Too often, the rhetorician plays the menace and it must be admitted that most often in the matters of science it's a theist. A creationist rhetorician will hide behind a mass of unfinished, ill-quoted, misinformed, assumptions and subjective arguments. We even catch them holding up completely discredited and disproved theories like the infamous "irreducible complexity of the eye" and the "irreducible complexity of the bacterial flagellum." If the creationist initiates a question on science and the atheist responds with a line of science, he will follow a line of so-called morality, and visa versa, evading the issue.

Too often theists in general get represented by meddling rhetoricians who aren't qualified to teach a high school biology class. But on the other hand, Atheists are just as guilty. Such is the case with Dawkins. Dawkins is a Biologist; that's what he is. But you see him attempting to speak authoritatively on philosophy, morality, history, ethics, virtue, etc. He's not qualified to comment on any of those things and usually he ends up hackneying out arguments from Kant, Hegel, and Hume with shaky form and questionable understanding. Even if he did possess a good understanding of such philosophies, which has not been evidenced, he does not have the ability to defend these philosophies systematically, nor can he explain their intricacies. It's cocktail party knowledge; they don't really even know what they are talking about.

Because of this, Dawkins and other atheists often come out strong with tricky and hard ethical questions, but end up feebly retiring prematurely, feigning a noble profession of ignorance in an attempt to make their opponents look arrogant. That's not to say that such atheist debaters don't exist, those who are philosophers and anthropologist, etc. Rather, most often apologetics debates are completely mismatched. In fact, I've never seen one that was well matched. I've observed a team of atheists versus a team of creationists. But what if such a panel existed where you had the best of the best? The atheist team having an anthropologist, a biologist, a philosopher, and a physicist; and the theist side had a theologian, a biologist, a philosopher, and a physicist? Only then I think would such a debate be worthy of note; a debate where another two could continue where the former two left off.

Anyway, as stated, most apologetics debates disintegrate once the issue of philosophy and theodicy arise. The debate turns into a defamation of ideas, a verbal slug-fest, and all sides deteriorate into ridiculous non sequiturs and random scenarios designed not to reveal the truth, but rather into trap the opponent in his words or trick him into admitting something as if character assassination was the point of the debate. This of course usually takes place at the end of the debate once both sides are fatigued after having tried to their utmost to make eloquent arguments and eloquent refutations. It becomes nothing more than a show of vanity by the end, very often.

Leaving aside the venue of apologetics and focusing on theodicy, I think the subject deserves some treatment. It's a fair question the atheist asks," If there is a God, then why is there so much suffering and what we might call evil in the world?" The thing is, most atheists would be talking out both sides of their mouth by even saying this. Atheist don't believe in a universal morality, they don't believe in objective ethics and virtues. In fact, most of them would staunchly defend the notion that these are conventional, man-made, subjective concepts. So, in essence, if we take their assertion as just stated, then that would be like asking an Alaskan native to account for culture of the Bushmen of Africa. Subjective is subjective right?

But far from attempting to wiggle out of answering, like the rhetorician does, I'm just pointing out the hypocrisy there, and I'll go a little further. The atheist asks the question because the theist is stating that there is an objective morality and that there is a universal right. So, the atheist is basically putting a ball in the theists court that he's pretty sure the theist can't possibly dribble. That's fair; the atheist shouldn't have to argue the theists side of the argument for him. But supposing that the atheist is right, what then? What do we make of evil? What can we possibly say? There's only one thing we can say: there is no real evil, there is no real morality. What then? If there's no tangible, objective moral difference between giving a person a hug and giving them poison, then there is no problem of evil. It simply doesn't exist.

This is where the atheist hypocrisy usually rears it's ugly head and we have a full on, uncompromising endorsement of morals from the atheist, which is exactly what they atheist was refusing to tolerate from the theist. Except, instead of the theist's morals, the atheist pushes post-modern humanism down everyone's throat. So, the atheist only condemns the theist so they can turn around and do the same exact thing, and that as we all know, whether you're a theist or an atheist, is pure hypocrisy.

Theodicy can seem like a tough nut to crack, but in reality the only thing that makes it a tough subject is that people apply strawmen to the people arguing the issue. For some reason, the theist isn't allowed to make an argument unless he defends the Calvinist double-predestination, where God controls everything and everyone and micromanages the universe with supreme impeccability, right down to the tiniest quirk. That's kinda like the atheist saying to the theist," Hey, let's race, but you have to drive in the car I give you." Huh?

In a universe where God and man are both described according to the Catholic schematic, answering theodicy isn't problematic at all. The universe works in the same pattern as we observe everyday. Parents make a child, the child once grown has choices to make. It can make good choices or bad choices. In short, freewill is the answer to theodicy. At the bottom of each of my blogs I have my favorite quote from Aristotle, perhaps from all philosophy," Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim."

God is the good; the good is certainly something anyone can give assent to and at the same time know that it is immeasurable. Here we have a reasonable argument concerning God, I think.. Everyone does what they do for a reason, even when accidents happen, they did certain things which set the accident in motion. A woman procures an abortion so that she will not be encumbered with a child, aiming at the good of freedom. A man steals to satisfy a desire, aiming at the good of happiness. People rape to satisfy sexual urges and to establish dominance, aiming at the goods of power and pleasure. All of them fail miserably. In the end, however, they prove Aristotle correct, that all things do in fact aim at the Good.

So, the problem of evil is exactly what Christians have been saying it is all along: a conflict between man's ability and desire to obtain the good. It comes down to free will. Man must take responsibility for the problem of evil, because he causes it and eliminates it, by both action an inaction. This has nothing to do with God being malevolent and everything to do with His sovereignty. As the Greek philosophers were so fond of saying," The sun, too, peers into privies and is not contaminated by them." That evil exists has not to do with God. In fact, evil is a kind of vacuum, seeing as how God is the Good and evil is chiefly a lack of good, as we have just demonstrated with the rapist, the thief, and the murderer. The Christian schematic isn't problematic at all, like the Atheist suggested it was. It's only problematic if Christianity is forced in such a debate to defend a heresy and a non-God. There, theodicy solved.
 
"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Euthanasia Should Remain Illegal

In the recent decades there has been quite a bit of talk concerning euthanasia. The proponents of euthanasia say that every person has the right to die. On this point we might all agree, but this is not really at the heart of the issue. The question isn’t whether or not man has the right to die, but rather does man have the right to kill himself? Here, I will do my best to convince you that man doesn’t have that right at all. My purpose is to give you well founded and systematic reasons for why these practices are bad for society and the individual on various levels. Further, my intent is not to persuade you by means of rhetoric, but if I can win you over by reason then I have succeeded.

Euthanasia is defined in the Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as the act or practice of killing or permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals in a relatively painless way for reasons of mercy. Also, Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines suicide as the act or an instance of taking one's own life voluntarily and intentionally, especially by a person of years, of discretion, and of sound mind. However, for the purposes of our discussion we will use an expanded definition of euthanasia, which is inclusive of psychological problems as well. The reason being that those who believe euthanasia is a right, believe that the psychologically impaired should have equal access to euthanasia.

Immortalhumans.com says in its online article titled An Overview On Euthanasia; Are We the Master of Our Own Destiny, “In 2002, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize doctor –assisted suicide. Around 20% of the death toll in the country is from euthanasia and it is believed that out of this 12% is involuntary. The consent or acknowledgment of doctor-assisted suicide gave rise to illegal dilemma of falsified proof of death willingness. Imagine the ramifications of legalizing euthanasia. People would live in fear, instead of having doctors willing to treat patients, there would be doctors ready to kill them instead.”

Euthanasia is intended to be a way out for individuals who are faced with often incurable diseases, for the elderly who do not want to die in the due course of time, for those who are suicidal, and the depressed. The argument goes that these individuals have the right to do with their bodies what they please; they have a right to choose whether or not they will continue to live in such painful physical and psychological conditions. In fact, there is a wide array of arguments for doctor assisted euthanasia. This is partly due to the popularity of the issue. I’ll take a moment here to mention some of the pro-euthanasia arguments.

One very popular argument is that if man is allowed to choose how he will live, then it follows that he should be allowed to choose how he shall die. This argument seems reasonable, until we examine it further. Do we get to choose how we live? Are any of you living exactly as you would if you did indeed have the choice? The answer is no, because nature, circumstance, and society work in unison against us to put restrictions on our ability to do exactly what we want, when we want and therefore no one is living as they choose. Man does not have the right to live as he chooses, nature has not provided for that. So, if man does not have the “right” to choose how he will live, then it follows that he does not have the right to choose how he will die either. Therefore, this is a fallacious argument for euthanasia.

Another popular argument for euthanasia and suicide is that which appeals to nature. These people argue based on instances of suicide and euthanasia observed in nature across various species. The argument goes that often enough in nature there are instances where herds leave behind the elderly to die. They also make mention of the suicidal tendencies of various species. The purpose of this argument is to establish that suicide is a natural impulse, and euthanasia is a natural way for a community to deal with the eminent death of its members. They reason that if they can show euthanasia and suicide to be natural impulses then the government does not have the right to make them illegal or regulate them. 

The problem with this argument is quite simple. While animals both euthanize and commit suicide, they also have sex with their siblings and parents, lick their anuses, and not only eat each others children, but their own as well; and I might add that they do so with far greater frequency than they do euthanasia and suicide. So, if we are to allow euthanasia and suicide based off of natural evidences, we must first allow cannibalism, murder, and incest. Therefore, this is another fallacious argument.

Another very popular argument is that euthanasia doesn’t hurt anyone. Notice here that this argument is made only for euthanasia. This is in part because to say the same concerning suicide is ridiculous. Many of us know of someone who has committed suicide. Some of us have seen the sad slope into despair and the final self-destruction of our loved ones. No one can say that suicide only hurts the person who commits it.

So, instead the argument is made that “euthanasia” doesn’t hurt anyone else. When this argument for euthanasia is propounded it is coupled with images of the terminally ill, crippled individuals, and aging widows. It is far easier to stomach such an idea when we imagine a person suffering from AIDS in a doctor’s office receiving a painless shot that ends their suffering. It’s easier if we think of a person whose whole body is paralyzed from the neck down, choosing to end their hopeless life. Or the lonely 80 year old widow whose family never visits her; who has passed the last seven years alone without her lifelong husband.

Those scenarios are much easier for us to accept, because they appeal to our sense of mercy, hence the term “mercy killing.” They don’t involve a bloody bed spread that someone shot themselves on; they don’t involve someone vomiting to death while trying to dial 911, because they changed their mind and don’t want to die after all. It’s in a sterile environment, administered by a medical professional, and they just go to “sleep.”

But this proposition is yet another argument rife with errors of logic. Specifically, this is what is called a ‘pathetic argument’ and is an error of logic. This argument attempts to assert the rightness of itself by appealing to emotions while pointing at the pitiable and pathetic state of the object being argued; in this case a person.

We are compelled to agree with this argument, because it appeals to emotion; not because it corresponds with reason. To quote Socrates,” A system of morality which is based on relative emotional values is a mere illusion, a thoroughly vulgar conception which has nothing sound in it and nothing true.” We are sold on this argument because it makes euthanasia out to be some sort of good for those who are suffering incurable and hopeless physical conditions. However, in the same instance they try to “shoe-horn” in psychological cases as well, for instance the lonely widow scenario. They try to gain the moral superiority by making a claim to mercy. 

Further, they are pretending that it is the same species of mercy by lumping all of their scenarios together. Can we truly compare a person with a mangled and paralyzed body to an otherwise healthy elderly person who is simply tired of living? This argument creates a plethora of moral, philosophical and ethical dilemmas and in no way levies an effective argument. For instance, are those who are psychologically impaired with suicidal depression fit to make such choices? No.

The argument that euthanasia doesn’t hurt anyone else is based on the idea that we are all sovereign; that we are independent individuals who have a right to do whatever we want with our bodies. Let’s say that we do legalize euthanasia based on this thesis, what will the second and third order effects be? How far can we take this philosophy and what will it do to society? How will it change our laws, our world view, and our social norms? If we are the masters of our own bodies and immune to government interference concerning what we do with them, then it follows that we should legalize all illegal drugs. We should be able to do heroine, cocaine, ecstasy, crack and LSD. Prostitution should be legalized. Further, the sale of human body parts should no longer be illegal.

Where does this philosophy end? If you open the door, what else must you let in? Why don’t we allow people to do or sell crack? Because it ruins lives, and those lives add up to make communities, which add up to make society. The sale of illegal drugs has an adverse effect on society; that is why people may not do what they want to with their bodies. Similarly, the sale of body parts is illegal because people would be performing operations on each other and thousands of people would die; people might even murder in order to sell off body parts at a high price if they could readily sell it in a free market. We don’t allow prostitution because of the spread of disease, the increase of crime and the moral decay it brings to society. 

The idea that a person should be allowed to do whatever they want to their own body is diametrically opposed not only to our laws, but to reason itself. The very idea promotes anarchy. Anarchy is the philosophy of “Do what thou wilt.” This selfish philosophy does injury to society which is a mutual necessity for the individual and the collective. 

In the end, all arguments for euthanasia and suicide are either fallacious, subjective, or both. The argument for euthanasia is not built on rational arguments or facts. Further, for the past 2,500 years the physicians and doctors of the West have take then Hippocratic Oath where in it is written: “I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.” The very idea of euthanasia disagrees with the medical arts, and with our common ancestors

To recap, there is a difference between having the right to die and the right to kill oneself. We may choose to not be resuscitated; we may even decline treatment or cure for life threatening diseases. We may choose martyrdom over self-defense, or we may even prefer to be killed instead of killing. These instances differ from euthanasia, because we are not killing ourselves, neither are we hastening the inevitable. Man does indeed have the right to die, but he does not have the right to hasten the inevitable and take his own life, because it is against the natural law. Therefore, no government can make right what is inherently wrong in nature, even if they should legalize it; and if a government cannot make right what is wrong it most certainly should not try and give license to the people to do what is wrong. There is no sufficient evidence to support the right to kill one’s self in nature, in philosophy, in science, in antiquity, or otherwise. If anyone can effectively make the argument for suicide and euthanasia, proving that it is indeed good and beneficial for mankind to practice, then let them make their argument and better mankind. 

Otherwise, we must submit to the facts. It is a question of law and not of passions and opinions. To quote John Adams,” Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidences.” We must judge this matter based solely on the evidences produced for and against euthanasia. When our liberty is destroyed through the abuse thereof, we are returned to the tyranny of our passions. We have liberty for a purpose, and not for the sake of itself. Liberty does not give us the right to do whatever we want; liberty and lawlessness are not synonyms. Euthanasia, suicide and all other such practices must remain illegal, because we are a society of laws; laws which extend from and expound on our fundamental rights as human beings.

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

The End of Education

 The value of a college education depends on what you do with it and what sort of person you are. Summarily, however, education in itself, if educated in the truth can only have a positive effect on the whole of the person. As Juvenal the Roman poet said,” A healthy mind in a healthy body.”

        

In the beginning of higher education, as we are familiar with it, we see it as a means of bettering both the society around us and ourselves, it was a pious activity designed to enlighten one and all in antiquity. This seems to have changed, however, and while the benefit of college education is evident everywhere, it has popularly become a tool to be used only in becoming richer. In this case, we see that what was meant to free mankind, emancipate his soul, and move us forward as a society has become a means with which to exacerbate objectification.

         

 If our education only serves to enable our various base impulses, then all we see is the continual waxing of “blindness” to the truth, which only brings about unhappiness. The positions we earn via education become a yoke and do not help us. If a person gets educational honors in a process they loathed, so that they can do a job that is loathsome, simply so they can have a bigger house and more money… they are miserable. They are constantly tortured by their own wantonness, which they have enabled and inflamed, to do what they don’t want to do so that they can have what they want. When they finally get what they want they are concerned with keeping it, and the savor they should have enjoyed the thing with is marginalized by the excessive bitterness whereby they acquired it! This cycle is repeated indefinitely. The person is worse off than a slave, because a slave at least gets to do what he wants to sometimes, this person never does. 

In this instance, it is far better that a man, simply do good and be good and not go to college, lest he glut his passions and ruin his life. After all, Diogenes was right," Content is the wealth of nature." and," Whoever is content with the least, has the most."

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Oedipus the Akratic

The story of Oedipus is designed to inculcate into the hearers a two fold lesson; the first being that of the value of virtue and the second being of the value of reason. Oedipus lacks both virtue and reason, being of a highly akratic nature, or at least it can be argued so, especially in the Greek fashion, which I will make some attempt to prove. It is through the exposition of the consequences that arise from being bereft of reason and virtues that the man Sophocles attempts to establish their desirability in the mind of the hearer. As it is said, fear is a good.

So, proceeding from that thesis, having narrowed down our search to the akratic nature of a single man, Oedipus, I think that it is best to at first with brevity say what I mean in the main. Oedipus appears as a man of virtue, a savior even. By the priest he is called “noblest of men” (line 46). However, I will point out that he is not called this because he is in fact the noblest of men, but there is some duty in the words of the priest. It is not pedantry to point out that the priest is talking to the king and indeed I would be indolent if I did not so much as point out that Oedipus had in fact been the savior of their city. Hitherto, I have not brought down the virtue of Oedipus, but I will. It will become evident that Oedipus has very little control over his passions.
However, before I take in the hand the defamation of a character as great as Oedipus is said to be, let us first be certain of the general so that we might avail reason concerning that which is particular.

Here is my mean, we must be sure to identify precisely those things which I have claimed to be lacking in Oedipus, namely virtue and reason. Plainly, I do not say anything on my own authority, but I appeal to your own knowledge of the general and exhort you to use it in the particular. Is not virtue a vice when practiced without moderation? Can a person be just if their integrity is so great that they become merciless? Is not mercy a good? Only, again we see that mercy itself is a good, but not for all. When mercy is misapplied is it not a means of enablement for lawlessness and disorder? There can be no question. The discernment for the particular applications concerning these virtues requires reason.

Reason is precisely what makes humans human. It's the ability to think abstractly, to go beyond instinct. It's the necessity of logic and intellect to survive that makes us human; without intellect man dies. As a person Oedipus is extremely instinctual and this causes many problems for him. We see this when he is pushed off of the highway,” The driver, when he tried to push me off, I struck in anger… And then I killed them all (810-817).” Beyond this, reason is what makes virtue virtuous. As stated before, without some discernment of proper use, virtuous things cannot be applied appropriately without luck.

Where exactly does this impious nature in Oedipus come from? I say ‘impious’ because virtues and reason are holy qualities; at least they are to me and they were to the Greeks (lines 302-304). A writer for the explicator agrees, and points out the same, saying,” Light, to the ancient Greeks, was beauty, intellect, virtue, indeed represented life itself. The Choragus asks Oedipus, ‘What god was it drove you to rake black / Night across your eyes?" Further, I say impious because we discern that while they are holy things, this in fact denotes another characteristic, which is divinity. Things are not divine because they are holy, they are holy because they are divine and proceed corporeally and incorporeally, respectively, from the Divine. So, from whence does this impiety in Oedipus derive? Certainly, his impiety begins in his mother and father. In Nassaar’s exposition of Sophocles’ ‘Oedipus the King’, he points out that,” … his (Oedipus’) father Laius decides to kill Oedipus at birth, and his mother's scorn for Apollo and his prophecies is traceable to this terrible event. She defies and rejects Apollo and his priests for the sake of Oedipus, nursing a lifelong contempt for them.”

Lauis is guilty, insofar as he becomes impious by trying to thwart the gods. Instead of submitting to their omniscient ways, he rather arrogantly, from the god’s point of view, assumes he will make their prophecies come to nothing. Because of this impiety he “pierces the ball joints” of his son’s ankles and arranges to have the infant exposed, thrown out (line 1040).

So, it can be seen that Oedipus is of impious blood from the start, with many evidences in the story reiterated by many characters. However, this is only one sort of source and one source indeed for his impiety. There is another source of his impiety and it is the same as his father’s; namely fear. Despair is the mother of iniquity in these men's lives as it is in most people’s lives. Their despair and fear drive them to disrespect the gods. Instead of being fatalistic and stoic in facing their fate, they behave nihilistically. Their actions are arrogant, putting man too high; assuming that they could and would bring Phoebus’ prophecies to nothing. Oedipus tries to accomplish this by running away from Corinth.

Indeed, if there had been any flexibility and mercy to the prophecy, it would have been found in the reason of truth and the virtue of mercy. Assuming that the portent was not one of predestination, but rather of things foreseen, the prospect changes a bit. If Apollo was writing with a divine pen the destiny of the family of Laius, then such a thing is, in fact, what is called double predestination and man cannot fight such divine literature. If, however, Apollo was looking at the events of the future with time rolled out before him like a scroll, it all means another thing; I strongly suggest that this is the case.

Assuming that my theologoumenon is the case, that the god was actually doing a favor for Laius by telling the future, the onus is on Laius for all calamities. It seems unreasonable to assume that the gods would make Lauis impious only to destroy him, in order that fear be struck into the hearts of those they completely control anyway. That is asinine. It seems more right, and offends logic less, if the god solicits the use of reason. If someone says to another,” Something terrible is going to befall you.” which is better to do, act well or act evil?

The portent solicits no particular action. The portent merely “IS” and therefore, the portent being benign itself must be left aside in the question. A new question arises, namely, is it better to be good and do good or to be evil and do evil? It is clear that Oedipus, Lauis, and Iocosta repeatedly fail to attain to that which is good and because of it more sins occur. As often as possible they make twins of their sin. An example is Oedipus pronouncing curses imprudently as if it might alleviate the god inflicted suffering in the land, somehow. He foments ignorance in his own person and incenses himself, abandoning all reason and mercy. While he is making his reason less and less potent, he sins against the innocent and defames Creon with preposterous accusations of treason and plotting. Even, further, in his vain attempt to alleviate curses by pronouncing curses, he once again is found trying to bring the words of the gods to nothing. His sins are multitudinous against god and man. By these means he brings down the vengeance of a god whose judgment is sovereign and incontrovertible in Greek culture.

So, to the particular Oedipus abandons reason by first abandoning piety. Instead of making good his own goodness, he takes to cursing others in an attempt to abase them morally and lift himself likewise. This is a very “un-Greek” thing to do, isn’t it? We see that wherever an enemy is confronted in classical Greek literature, the protagonist makes a beatific litany of the antagonist’s accomplishments, virtues, honors, nobility of birth, heroisms, etc… in order that upon victory over such a person they deem themselves greater in all respects, though this person was great. Oedipus, very incongruently with the other myths, does quite the opposite and cheaply publishes a curse with his lips in order to separate himself from the sins which brought the plague. Let me point out that Oedipus’ attitude, while not only imprudent, espouses some peculiar divinity. Why do all of Oedipus’ contemporaries in the myths need other men in order to be great, but Oedipus does not? Look at mighty Hector, a man of respect, loved of the gods. Oedipus indeed is compared to other men, insofar as he solved a riddle and saved the city. But where is iron put to iron to prove his greatness? Nowhere, indeed! Not only this, but look at the prophet who is given vision from a god. Inasmuch as the prophet is a prophet the gods are glorified because it is precisely they who give vision. Or mighty Hector, slayer of men, he is great because of his loyalty to other men and because of his noble victories over many other noble men. Glory either comes from other men or from the gods, one is vanity and the other is true glory, but nonetheless does glory come from another.

So, what does Oedipus make himself out to be? When we say a man is "great," do we say it because he is greater than other men or do we say it because he is great and, therefore, better than other men? Surely, we say he is great because he is better than the rest, for he became this way and necessitates the need of others to be great by comparison. For, if and we say he is great and therefore better we make him a demigod. This is precisely what Oedipus has made himself out to be through his many vain pronouncements, one of which is when he points out the he solved the riddle with his own reason and not revelations from the gods or augury from birds (lines 400-405); this infuriates the gods. However, as stated before, logic is intrinsically a divine and holy object; notice, then, how irreverently boastful Oedipus is over his wit. He blurts this out while berating a blind prophet of the gods for being indolent with him to save Oedipus pain. He is impious in the midst of a tantrum and, of course, a tantrum is the bastard child of a person who lacks the four virtues of courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice. As Aristotle said so plainly,” Wit is educated insolence.” As it turns out, this is all that Oedipus ever had, educated insolence. In the poem we see that insolence exercised against god and man, and not until calamity befalls him is that insolence exorcised from him. So, one might say, when taken as a whole, the gods had done a sore but good thing to Oedipus. It is better for his flesh to corrupt and be destroyed than to be interned to Hades owing some great debt to the gods. The gods saved his soul and purged him of insolence and impiety. It is only horrific to men because they all at once in the corporeal see what happens to Oedipus because of impiety, which is in reality only what is regularly done in the House of the Dead.


"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~

Why Every Christian Needs the Catholic Church-Things You've Never Thought About

I'm in the process of transferring a lot of my notes, so bear with me:

It's been quite some time since I've written anything to the Protestants. But they have entered into my mind once again, with their assertions that the Catholic religion is superfluous to Christianity. I am convinced that the majority of those who hold this opinion have never given any real thought to the matter. So, being willing and quite able to supply, I figured that I would do through exercise of reason what they have lost the ability to do by the atrophy thereof, namely, reason. Let it be noted that this is a general reply to certain assertions made by Protestants. I'll just begin...

The Protestants claim that Catholicism is superfluous to Christianity; they do this through a number of stock charges, all of which are fallacious, the majority of which are strawmen. But that is neither here nor there. I do not feel compelled to defend the Church; I've see enough feeble assaults against it by Protestants to convince me that it is in fact unassailable. I am much more interested in what the Protestants who make this argument think they know.

If the Catholic religion is a superfluity, if it is a body of man-made traditions, doctrines, and dogmas unnecessary to salvation and a proper Christian faith and they claim to have discovered this, then, it follows that they must know what is essential to the Christian faith. In fact, I don't think that there is any danger in me saying that Protestants must imagine that they are bare essential Christians.

If I was to ask them what things are essential to the Christian faith, what can we imagine them to say? I suppose that they would say several things are necessary: faith in salvation through Jesus Christ, the bible, the Holy Spirit. Further, if I were to then ask them which person has a purifying effect upon the people of God, I would get several different answers: the pastors, the community of believers, and the Holy Spirit.

So, here I have the Protestant faith in general which states that a biblical faith in Jesus Christ is sufficient for salvation. Further, that the whole community of believers has a refining effect upon the Christian and that the Holy Spirit is his guide in all of this. Now, we have six things to examine, here, six essentials beyond which the Christian, according to the Protestant, has need of nothing.

So, let us discuss pastors in general. How are they chosen? Are they selected from seminaries or do they begin as house church leaders, or something like that; or do all of those things occur? Certainly, all of those things occur; no one would say that all Protestant pastors have seminary and likewise no one would say that none of them do. In any case, who does the selecting? The individual churches, of course, choose their pastors. In some cases, the former pastor will choose a new pastor and so on. But in the end, if the church is discontented with the pastor, whether he has seminary or not they will eject him from their employ. And if the people do not have the power to eject him they will leave and go to another Church.

So, I must ask the question again, who does the choosing? It is the people who choose. Further, having seminary might be a means of more directly gaining employment as a pastor, but it is not usually a factor in whether or not a pastor keeps his position. Ergo, if a man without seminary finds himself employed as the pastor of a protestant community, his having seminary on his resume is not going to be a factor of whether or not he remains the pastor. Therefore, there is no real advantage to seminary beyond gaining employment. What matters is the people's opinion of the man.

This I find extremely strange. When a man goes to receive his doctorate in the medical arts, he does not go before a board of nurses, but instead he goes before a board of medical doctors. Or if a person went to receive a license of any kind, don't we all know that they must receive the license from someone else so licensed? Whoever obtains a drivers license must obtain the license from someone who can drive, and whoever obtains a license for gun ownership must obtain it from someone apt in teaching the laws concerning ownership. Therefore, the person without seminary who claims themselves a pastor is like a person who claims to license themselves.

Also, if the community decides that he is to be a pastor, I find this even more strange. The ignorant are commissioning a teacher as though they are qualified to do so! A person is a teacher because they are apt in knowledge, the pupil is the pupil because he is ignorant of what the teacher teaches. If the pupil is ignorant of what he will be taught, then it follows necessarily that he is ignorant of what he needs to be taught, who knows it, and who is able to teach it. Imagine, that we took a rhetorician, whose task it is to convince through routine the ignorant of whatever he pleases, and placed him in with eight doctors. Let us further say that we placed them before a crowd of average people. Whom do you suppose the ignorant mass of people will say is the best of the doctors? It is certain they will say the man who speaks the best is the best doctor. They have no objective way of gauging the excellence of the doctors, because they are ignorant of the art. It is for the very reason of their ignorance that they need a doctor!

So, having selected the rhetorician to be their doctor, do you suppose they will enjoy many benefits because of this? Do you suppose that they will enjoy great health by him? No, they certainly will not. And so we know that not only are the people ill equipped to select good teachers for themselves because of their ignorance, but that they have even less business choosing a teacher from amongst their ignorant fellows. The person without seminary has no business in either case, whether he chooses himself or is chosen by his fellows, to be a pastor.

Now, concerning the man who has been to seminary, let us examine. If we went to a doctor and became dissatisfied with him and demanded his license to be revoked, how would we go about this? We would take him to court and lawyers would go find his peers, true doctors, and his practice would be examined. If his peers found that he was guilty of malpractice then he would surely be punished to the fullest extent possible. We would not simply strip him of his license and rights because a rabble of discontented folk, ignorant in medicine, brought an accusation against him. Never!

Likewise, if we find that a doctor is guilty of malpractice, but the patients love him and make many excuses for him will this in anyway prevent the law from delivering what it must, namely, justice? Will pathetic pleas and stories of how great and faithful a family doctor he was save him from the fact of his malpractice of medicine? No, never! He will be striped of his license and prevented from practicing medicine wherever the law can prohibit it and fines and possibly imprisonment will follow.

In this way, the doctor is aloof from the ignorance of his patients. When he is a good doctor and they are bad patients he is safe and secure in his position and they still have recourse to him because he provides to them what they cannot provide to themselves. When he is a bad doctor, the ignorant nostalgia and favoritism of his patients will not save him and he will no longer be allowed to misapply the art of medical science. The doctor is established by his peers and knowledge which no man takes away.

It should be the same with pastors. However, as our inquiry has revealed, this is not the case. Ordained ministers find themselves a congregation of one if they do not do as the ignorant require. The ordained minister is not protected from the ignorance of his people at all. He must be careful not to hurt them, even if he must; he must be careful to entertain them and conform to their expectations. If he doesn't they will abandon him or eject him from employment. If at any time they become discontented with the ordained minister, they will prefer the unordained man who knows how to tickle their ears, to him.

And how can we be sure of this? Which would children prefer, the teacher who teaches or the teacher who gives them games? The one who gives them games. And which do the children prefer to listen to, a block of instruction, or a story? A story. And which one will the people rather encounter, a police officer who is lax or one who delivers justice? The officer who is lax. And I could continue on this way, ad infinitum.

We can, therefore, confidently know which man the congregation will prefer. So, what Protestants posses is democracy, which is the worst form of government. Democracy descends into despotism, because mob always gives birth to a tyrant. Democracy always murders itself and chooses the wrong instead of the good. It is short sighted, selfish, ignorant, anarchic. In this "democratic Christianity" that Protestants possess who is in charge? Obviously, the same people who are in charge in all democracies, man in general. I can devise of no other form of government which is more dissimilar to monarchy than democracy. Where is the singular rule of Apostolic authority? Where is Christ the king? How ironic that they accuse the Catholic Church of being an organization of men, when they have democracy. Their communities simply could not be more man-made. You begin to see why I said I don't think that Protestants have given any real thought to their position on the Catholic religion.

But we should hold right here, because here we find that the Protestants have been consistent in one thing: they asserted that the whole community of faith has a refining effect on the Christian. This keeps with their democratic attitude. And I'm certain that when I said," Where is Christ the king?" some of you were saying," He is in all of us!" So, Protestants claim then, that they whole community of faith has a refining effect on the Christian. Then, you have only to shut off from the outside world and make your communities exclusive and you will be excellent. But what does history tell us about such experiments? I think that the Puritans are sufficient evidence that this is not true, witch trials and all.

Protestants claim that because they have the holy Spirit, the bible, and have Jesus in their hearts, that they all have a refining effect upon one another. But what about health, because the business of the church primarily is the health of the soul, or as the Protestants like to say, the spirit? So, what about other kinds of health? What of mental health? Do all people have a refining effect on the health of the mind, or do only some people have a positive effect on the mind? And bodily health, too; do all people have a positive effect on the health of the body, or only a few people? Obviously, only a few people do good to these and the rest do damage or nothing.

And what about people who live in houses, do they all know how to build houses because they possess them? Or people who drive cars, do they know how to make them, because they own them? Or people with tumors, do they know how to treat them because they possess them? No, only a few know how. But here, then, the Protestant stands confuted with his mouth open, because it is obvious even to children that there is no way that everyone has a refining effect, but rather that only a few have this effect. So, the democratic nature of Protestant Christianity is necessarily counter-intuitive to the end of religion, just as it would be counter-intuitive to bodily health if suddenly everyone claimed to be a surgeon.

If they understand this, why are they doing this?

"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." ~Aristotle~